




Expert Evidence in Flatland:                                      
The Geometry of a World Without Scientific Culture 
David L. Faigman∗ 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
Although I was invited primarily to comment on Professor Dale 
Nance’s contribution to this Symposium, Reliability and the 
Admissibility of Experts,1 I hope my comments will have relevance 
beyond the four corners of his article.  Without question, his article is 
a laudable piece of evidence scholarship.  Indeed, that is its main 
defect.  But Professor Nance is far from alone, for this failing is 
shared by much of the legal scholarship and judicial authority in this 
area.  Briefly put, Professor Nance deals with the subject of expert 
evidence mainly the way traditional evidence scholars have 
approached this subject from time immemorial.  But expert evidence 
is not like other kinds of evidence.  While it shares many superficial 
features with ordinary evidence, it is nothing like such mainstays of 
evidence doctrine as hearsay or character.  This bare resemblance has 
led many astray.  Scientific evidence—and after Kumho Tire2 all expert 
testimony—requires courts to make science policy.3  This is not 
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 1 Dale A. Nance, Reliability and the Admissibility of Experts, 34 SETON HALL L. REV. 
191 (2003). 
 2 Kumho Tire Co. v. Carmichael, 526 U.S. 137 (1999) 
 3 In this Essay, I use the terms “expert evidence” and “scientific evidence” 
interchangeably.  In evidentiary terms, this is entirely appropriate since Rule 702 
applies to all expert testimony, not just scientific evidence.  Moreover, in Kumho Tire, 
Justice Breyer made clear that courts should expect no bright line dividing the 
scientific from the nonscientific.  Yet many courts and commentators continue to 
speak as if some line exists separating the two.  Even Professor Nance is partly guilty 
of seeing the world in this way.  See Nance, supra note 1, at 202.  But, as I have argued 
elsewhere, 
Science does not “exist” categorically or in some concrete encyclopedia 
of knowledge that passes muster by, say, some committee of the 
National Academies of Science.  Science is a process or method by 
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optional; it is part of the intrinsic nature of the subject.  The 
admissibility decision necessarily requires a policy judgment, and any 
treatment of the subject that fails to appreciate and incorporate that 
fact is missing an essential dimension of the problem. 
In Flatland: A Romance of Many Dimensions,4 a classic mathematical 
and satirical novel first published in 1884, Edwin A. Abbott explored 
what the world would look like to creatures that live in two-
dimensional space, having only length and width.  In Abbott’s 
flatland, geometric creatures inhabit a world that consists of an 
infinite plane.  According to Euclid, a point has zero dimensions, a 
line one, a plane two, and a solid three.  Abbott was actually 
interested in the provocative notion that we live in a universe with 
four (or more) dimensions—a notion with much modern currency 
given contemporary theories in physics.  But imagining four 
dimensions is quite difficult, so Abbott constructed a world with only 
two and described how that world would perceive creatures or objects 
from a three-dimensional world, a world he called “spaceland.”  
Appropriately, for present purposes, the story is narrated by a 
conservative lawyer named A. Square.  Other flatlanders appear as 
straight lines, and only by feeling their fellow creatures can they 
determine how many sides other flatlanders have.  In the rigidly 
hierarchical society of flatland, in which the number of sides one has 
designates social class, the upper classes consider this feeling about 
rather gauche. 
When a three-dimensional creature enters flatland, it appears to 
 
which factual statements or predictions about the world are devised, 
tested, evaluated, revised, replaced, rejected, or accepted . . . Courts 
make a fundamental error when they try to divide the world into 
science and specialty categories.  In truth, every expert who appears in 
court has “specialized” knowledge of one sort or another.  At best, it is 
specialized knowledge based upon good applied science; at worst, it is 
specialized knowledge based upon “years of personal experience.” 
David L. Faigman, Is Science Different for Lawyers, 297 SCIENCE 339, 340 (2002) 
[hereinafter Is Science Different].  Therefore, both as a practical matter and under the 
Rules of Evidence, it is inappropriate to distinguish between scientific and 
specialized testimony.  Rule 702 thus would be clearer if it simply applied to all 
specialized knowledge that “will assist the trier of fact to understand the evidence or 
to determine a fact in issue.”  FED. R. EVID. 702.  The issue presented by this 
Symposium—what standards should be applied post-Kumho Tire—also would be more 
plainly presented, since courts would be obligated to consider explicitly how well 
supported proffered, specialized knowledge must be before gaining admission, 
whether based on sound scientific methods, personal observation, or some level in 
between. 
 4 EDWIN A. ABBOT, FLATLAND: A ROMANCE OF MANY DIMENSIONS (1884); see EDWIN 
A. ABBOT, THE ANNOTATED FLATLAND: A ROMANCE OF MANY DIMENSIONS (Introduction 
and notes by Ian Stewart) (2002). 
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hover in space, expanding and retracting in dimension as it moves 
across the flatlanders plane of vision.  It would be as if the flatlander 
could perceive the world only from the surface of a pond.  A 
flatlander would not be able to see below the surface of the water or 
above it.  If a beach ball broke the surface, it would first appear as a 
dot, progressively expanding to its full diameter—though seen as a 
straight line—and then decreasing in size to a dot before 
disappearing entirely. 
Professor Nance’s evidentiary world operates similarly in two 
dimensions.  His flatland cannot account for the three dimensional 
space in which science operates.  Professor Nance’s world also lacks 
depth.  It is the depth of the scientific enterprise.  Nance’s flatlanders 
cannot see science before it emerges on the horizon of the 
courtroom or after it moves beyond that horizon.  An evidentiary 
flatlander sees scientific research programs as straight lines, and the 
standard for assessing admissibility amounts to little more than 
comparing their sizes.  Flatlanders have no perception of past 
scientific processes and no conception of future potential.  Their 
world lacks scientific culture.  Science seems to float abstractly along 
the flatlanders’ horizon, unconnected to space or time. 
Abbott’s flatlanders live in the same universe as spacelanders 
(i.e., us), so many of the descriptions of reality naturally resonate for 
Abbott’s three dimensional readers.  The same is true for Professor 
Nance’s discussion of expert testimony in evidence flatland.  In 
particular, Professor Nance’s two main theses have value in evidence 
spaceland.  The first is his belief that reliability is not a dichotomous 
variable.  Despite the fact that he believes that my coauthors and I 
(hereinafter referred to as Faigman et al., with my apologies to my 
coauthors, David Kaye, Michael Saks, and Joseph Sanders) erected 
just this sort of dichotomy, through our recognition that Daubert5 
requires a “threshold of reliability,”6 no one truly believes that 
reliability is a dichotomous variable.  The admissibility decision is, of 
course, categorical, but reliability and validity provide no such simple 
dichotomy.  The first section of this Essay briefly addresses Professor 
Nance’s imputation that Faigman et al. sought to make reliability 
dichotomous by mandating a minimum threshold requirement for 
scientific evidence. 
The second major theme of Professor Nance’s article is his 
embrace of what Faigman et al. called the “better evidence principle.”  
 
 5 Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharm., Inc., 509 U.S. 579 (1993). 
 6 David L. Faigman et al., How Good Is Good Enough?: Expert Evidence Under 
Daubert and Kumho, 50 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 645 (2000). 
  
258 SETON HALL LAW REVIEW Vol. 34:255 
Here, he finds much to like in our approach, although his is both 
rather more limited and somewhat broader than what we 
contemplated.  It is this thesis that loses depth when described from 
Professor Nance’s flatlander perspective.  The Nance better evidence 
rule, unlike Faigman et al.’s, is driven almost entirely—albeit not 
completely—by evidentiary concerns.  Faigman et al. were driven by 
different considerations.  It was our contention that the evidentiary 
determination regarding expert evidence must take into account—it 
must integrate into its foundational premises—the culture of the 
scientific method.  Whereas Professor Nance sees expert evidence as 
another species of evidence law, not unlike hearsay or character 
evidence, Faigman et al. saw it as a different animal altogether. 
II.  RELIABILITY AS A CONTINUOUS VARIABLE 
Professor Nance laments, “Unfortunately, prominent scholars . . 
. often agree, explicitly or implicitly, on the idea that the post-Daubert 
regime rightly requires expertise to exceed . . . a threshold of 
reliability.”7  He cites Professor Imwinkelried and Faigman et al. as 
examples.  Professor Imwinkelried, in this Symposium, 
unambiguously states that he does not see evidentiary reliability in 
dichotomous terms.8  Faigman et al. also hereby disclaim any 
intention to transform reliability into a dichotomous variable by our 
statement that Daubert requires “a minimal threshold of reliability.”  
All we meant was that, unlike Frye, in which expert evidence might be 
admitted after it has gained the confidence of a well-meaning guild—
with no empirical testing at all—Daubert requires some minimal 
amount of testing.  Although not all courts have implemented Daubert 
in this way, we argued that Daubert requires the production of some 
data that are the product of some reasonably reliable methods that 
have produced some results that can be generalized to the case in 
which they are offered.  This is the minimum and this is what the 
Daubert regime demands.  Our point, then, was similar to Chief 
Justice Rehnquist’s admonition in Joiner9 that courts cannot rely 
merely on the ipse dixit of testifying experts that their conclusions are 
reliable. 
Professor Nance is also incorrect in supposing that by advocating 
a minimal threshold we sought to “transform continuous variation 
 
 7 Nance, supra note 1, at 220-21. 
 8 Edward J. Imwinkelried, The Relativity of Reliability, 34 SETON HALL L. REV. 269, 
270 (2003) (“I agree with Professor Nance’s thesis that reliability should be 
conceived in relative terms.”). 
 9 Gen. Elec. Co. v. Joiner, 522 U.S. 136 (1997). 
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into dichotomous choice.”  It is commonplace for continuous scales 
to have thresholds that create “dichotomies.”  Thirty-two degrees 
Fahrenheit is the threshold for water turning to ice on the 
continuous scale of temperature.  I would imagine that even 
Professor Nance would grant that expert evidence regarding a 
prediction of future behavior (say, future violence) that relies on 
“scientific” measuring devices such as tarot cards, tea leaves, and 
crystal balls, falls below “a minimal threshold of reliability” under 
Daubert. 
I do agree that in regards to methods more sophisticated than 
crystal balls or casual observation, the reliability criterion should be 
relative.  Indeed, this is the whole point.  Unlike Professor Nance, 
however, I would not approach this issue as merely an evidentiary 
matter.  This needs to be understood as a matter of science policy. 
III.  EXPERT EVIDENCE IS DIFFERENT 
A.  The Nature of Expert Evidence 
The principal difference between expert testimony and other 
sorts of testimony to which the Federal Rules apply is that in virtually 
all cases a large aspect of the evidence transcends the particular 
dispute in which it is offered.  In the terminology of Kenneth Culp 
Davis, hearsay and character evidence are paradigmatic examples of 
adjudicative facts.10  They are particular to the dispute and their verity 
and value can largely be assessed through the lens of the particular 
case.  The same is not true for expert evidence.  Whether implicit or 
explicit, almost all expert opinion depends on considerations that 
transcend particular cases—or, at least, it ought to. 
The essence of expert opinion is that it is the process of both 
inductive and deductive reasoning.  Whether a defendant suffers 
from the battered woman syndrome or a tire failed because of 
“overdeflection,” the essence of the expert’s testimony is that this case 
is like other similarly situated cases in the world beyond the particular 
courtroom.  Similarly, accountants and realtors believe that their 
conclusions follow from experience with the world beyond the 
courtroom.  The specific case is in some way representative of some 
general phenomenon. 
Obviously, ordinary testimony also concerns experiences beyond 
the courtroom.  A witness who states that the light was red when the 
 
 10 See Kenneth Culp Davis, An Approach to Problems of Evidence in the Administrative 
Process, 55 HARV. L. REV. 364, 402-03 (1942). 
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plaintiff’s car went through the intersection or that the bloody knife 
was found in the defendant’s garage, is testifying to facts that 
occurred outside of the courtroom.  But the testimony pertains to 
single incidents, and, beyond the circumstances under which they 
were observed, neither the witness nor the fact finder needs to infer 
anything about the nature of the world more generally.  Consider, for 
example, the difference between a police officer’s testimony that he 
discovered drugs in the possession of the defendant and his proposed 
testimony that the defendant intended to sell those drugs.  As an 
ordinary fact witness, the officer might say that he found two pounds 
of marijuana wrapped in plastic and stashed in the defendant’s toilet-
tank.  In addition, the officer might testify that he found a scale for 
weighing small quantities in the defendant’s bedroom and baggies in 
the kitchen.  The officer, however, might seek to testify further—now 
as an expert—that in his experience defendants possessing two or 
more pounds of marijuana, together with scales to weigh the drugs 
and baggies to package them, usually possess the drugs with the 
intent to sell them.  Although courts routinely allow this sort of so-
called experiential testimony, the officer is no longer a simple fact 
witness.  The witness, like all experts, is saying that this defendant 
shares certain general characteristics that are associated with drug 
dealing, as opposed to simple possession for personal use.11 
Professor Nance offers the example of realtors who propose to 
testify on the value of certain property.  One party offers an expert 
who has taken an ostensibly scientific approach to the subject by 
surveying comparable property in the vicinity.  The opponent 
challenges this evidence and offers its own expert, one who used a 
“gestalt assessment,” which is more ordinarily described as “years of 
experience.”  Professor Nance’s answer to the question whether one, 
both, or neither of the experts gets to testify is instructive.  His focus 
is exclusively on the courtroom use of the evidence, and he admirably 
crunches the various considerations that might be presented in that 
limited forum.  He never mentions, or suggests as relevant, what sorts 
of empirical methods should be expected to be brought to bear in 
answering the empirical question regarding the value of property. 
Professor Nance analyzes such issues as the burden of proof, the 
judge’s role as “representative” of the jury, jury credulity, and so 
forth.  The key component and conclusion of his analysis seems to be 
 
 11 As discussed below, the officer’s hypothesis that possessors of two pounds of 
marijuana intend to sell rather than simply use the drug is testable by the scientific 
method.  Whether it should have to be tested is a policy judgment.  So far, the courts 
have assiduously avoided confronting this question or even recognizing that it must 
be answered. 
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that the judge should admit “the best evidence that is or should have 
been reasonably available, with due regard to the adversarial 
structure of the trial.”12  This means that evidence will be excluded 
under this theory only if the proponent of the evidence could have 
secured better evidence and that the evidence was not reasonably 
available to the opponent.13  Thus, Professor Nance constructs a 
scheme whereby the law of evidence would demand the best evidence 
that could be brought into the courtroom, and the assessment would 
be almost entirely a comparative one between what the proponent 
proffered and what other proof the proponent could have 
introduced.  In effect, then, the admissibility determination is made 
from a snapshot, and the court sees only the evidence before it, with 
no consideration of what has occurred before or might occur after 
the decision.  Professor Nance, however, carves an exception to this 
static picture for certain kinds of expertise, such as forensic evidence, 
since “repeat players, . . . may plausibly be considered in regard to the 
long run of cases, rather than based on what is reasonably available in 
the short enough run to address a particular case.”14 
The myopic snapshot by which Professor Nance would have trial 
courts judge scientific evidence is fundamentally flawed.  It fails to 
take into account the dynamic nature of empirical inquiry.  More 
ominously, it also fails to take into account the law’s effect on many of 
the disciplines that hawk their wares at the courthouse door.  If the 
gatekeeper metaphor is to have any meaning, it cannot be limited to 
having judges choose between poor alternatives.  Where Professor 
Nance would have judges ask whether better evidence is available, I 
would have them ask whether better evidence should be available.  
Judges should operate in three-dimensional space, not two. 
Indeed, as noted, Professor Nance advocates this more dynamic 
approach for “repeat players, such as the state in regard to forensic 
science techniques.”15  But the exception itself well illustrates the 
 
 12 Nance, supra note 1, at 241. 
 13 Id.. 
 14 Id. at 249.  This strategy seems to serve a possible normative agenda in 
Professor Nance’s proposed approach.  As he states, his “test will place greater 
demands on the prosecution than on the accused in criminal cases, and it will place 
greater demands on powerful civil defendants than on impecunious civil plaintiffs.”  
Id. at 247. 
 15 Id. at 249.  He does not say whether this exception applies to other “repeat 
players,” such as large corporations.  If one objective is to put “greater demands on 
powerful civil defendants,” then he might impose such a burden.  Unlike 
prosecutors, however, it is somewhat less clear that powerful civil defendants have the 
burden under Daubert to produce such evidence.  Prosecutors are not only repeat 
players, they bear the burden of proof as the proponent of the expert evidence. 
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cramped evidentiary perspective he brings to the subject of expert 
evidence.  Although litigation may be about “repeat players,” science 
is not.  Indeed, the whole point of science, as exemplified in the 
“peer review” standard of Daubert, is that many unrelated players will 
be part of the knowledge production business. 
Instead of “repeat players,” courts should attend to repeat 
expertise.  Consider, for example, the psychological concept of post-
traumatic stress disorder (PTSD).  Plaintiffs and defendants in civil 
cases, and prosecutors and defendants in criminal cases, have offered 
evidence of this syndrome.  Professor Nance would seemingly admit 
this evidence so long as it is as good as any other evidence that might 
be offered on the relevant issue—except, perhaps, for prosecutors 
who might be obligated to demonstrate that better evidence could 
not be forthcoming.  But this approach completely ignores the law’s 
influence on what work gets done.  Simply put, if courts demand 
better evidence than what has so far been done, then, and often only 
then, will that work be done.  In the case of PTSD, psychologists are 
not conventional parties to the litigation involving their research, yet 
they are very interested participants in the process and extremely 
sensitive to what courts demand as adequate proof.  What Professor 
Nance is missing is the fact that science is not a product of any one 
litigant or set of litigants.  For instance, the fact that a prosecutor in 
federal court in Newark has no data to validate handwriting 
identification has very little to do with that prosecutor.  Indeed, the 
last thing the evidence rules should do is encourage the United States 
Attorney in Newark to start collecting data.  The question is not 
whether the Newark prosecutor should be estopped from offering 
expert testimony because of a lack of data.  The issue is whether the 
courts should expect the scientific community (broadly defined) to 
have produced better data on handwriting. 
Professor Nance correctly states that the admissibility 
determination for expert evidence is a relative one.  His error is in 
limiting the dimensions on which this comparison is done.  Professor 
Nance appears to fear that an expansion of the inquiry to take into 
account the dimensions outside the courtroom will leave courts with 
no bearings.  Limiting the comparison to the courtroom permits 
judges the relatively simple task of measuring length and width.  
Perhaps expert evidence that is longest, or perhaps that with the most 
number of sides,, can be considered “best.”  Measuring depth 
complicates the judge’s gatekeeping task enormously.  It requires a 
reliability assessment of not only what is, but what might be. 
Professor Nance complains that this sort of approach is 
“vacuous,” for “[i]t merely restates the ‘sufficient reliability’ idea 
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without telling us anything affirmative about how to fill it out.”16  
Professor Nance continues, complaining, 
Without giving attention to the parameters in the balance that 
determine whether a given degree of reliability is reasonable for 
admission, this also effectively requires the judge to answer the 
question, “Does the degree of reliability of the expertise 
outweigh?”  Unless something follows the word “outweigh,” the 
question is practically incoherent.  Outweigh what?17 
The question is incoherent only because Professor Nance asks it 
in the flatland of the individual courtroom.  Nance’s concern about 
incoherence lies in the limitations of his flatlanders’ spatial 
disabilities, not in any inherent incoherence in the three-dimensional 
world of scientific evidence.  Consider Professor Nance’s real estate 
appraiser example.  Suppose that a realtor offers to testify on the 
basis primarily of his “years of experience,” perhaps buttressed by a 
listing of a dozen comparable properties in the area.  In Professor 
Nance’s world, the judge is reduced to comparing this expert 
testimony to what other evidence might be available.  To my 
knowledge, there is unlikely to be much better evidence available to 
the proponent, and thus the evidence will be admitted.  In Nance’s 
flatland, a realtor with twenty-five years of experience and a list of a 
dozen “comp-properties” would be the longest line around. 
Adding a third dimension to this analysis changes it completely.  
Now the question is, given the nature of the subject and the legal 
consequences that follow making a mistake (either of the false-
positive or false-negative variety), how much and what kind of testing 
should be necessary before it is admitted?18  This is hardly an 
incoherent question.  There are a multitude of ways that a 
scientifically-minded person might validate real estate appraisals.  
Appraisers, for instance, routinely assess the value of property before 
it goes on sale.  Yet, to my knowledge, appraisers do not keep track of 
the actual sale price of those houses, much less subject those data to 
statistical analysis.  Confounds like the amount of time between the 
appraisal and sale or changing market conditions could be measured 
and analyzed.  It does not take great scientific imagination to come 
up with many other research paradigms that might be brought to 
bear on this issue. 
I am not suggesting, however, that real estate appraisers (or 
researchers interested in this subject) should have to conduct 
 
 16 Nance, supra note 1, at 222. 
 17 Id. 
 18 See Is Science Different, supra note 3, at 340. 
  
264 SETON HALL LAW REVIEW Vol. 34:255 
original research testing their proficiency at the given task.  Whether 
such research should be required is a policy question on which I will 
remain agnostic.  But courts should have to make this policy 
judgment, for realtors, for psychologists, for forensic scientists, for 
medical doctors, and for any and all expert witnesses. 
Undoubtedly, many will complain about the difficulty of the 
task.  It is true that measuring depth, as well as length and width, 
complicates the judge’s job.  But so be it.  Science is complicated.  In 
fact, however, most of these determinations are not rocket science 
and are well within the grasp of most attorneys.  The task of 
evaluating realtors in three dimensions, for instance, is hardly 
formidable.  Much of forensic science and psychology similarly does 
not challenge the legal imagination too strenuously.  Indeed, the key 
stumbling block seems not to be whether the depth of the scientific 
enterprise can be understood, but a belief among many that this 
dimension is outside the purview of evidence law.  The flatlander’s 
perspective, according to this view, is mandated by the nature of the 
evidence world in which we live, rather than any lack of desire to 
escape to spaceland. 
B.  Scientific Evidence as Science Policy 
Two-dimensional perspectives such as Professor Nance’s flatland 
tend to concentrate on the adversarial nature of the trial and pay 
particular fidelity to the role of juror as trier of fact.  Given that the 
evidentiary plane is all that there is, this focus is hardly surprising.  
But once a third dimension is added, pedestrian concerns about jury 
credulity and attorney-control over evidence ought to recede into the 
background. 
Professor Nance is duly concerned about the juror’s role in the 
litigation process.  As others have struggled, he seeks to retain a 
prominent role for jurors in the evaluation of scientific evidence.  
This concern, however, is primarily associated with the belief that 
scientific evidence is somehow like ordinary evidence.  This leads 
Professor Nance into the thicket concerning jury credulity and the 
debate whether jurors are any less sophisticated than judges as 
consumers of expert testimony.  Not surprisingly, he rejects any 
notion that they are less sophisticated.  Such a view is heresy to 
evidence doctrine.  He bases his judgment of juror capacities on a 
combination of presumption, intuition, and empirical research that 
itself would never pass muster under Daubert.19  His alternative 
 
 19 Nance, supra note 1, at 232-33.  Evidence scholars and judges are keen to extol 
the virtues of jurors.  And it would be impolitic for me to suggest otherwise.  The 
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explanation for the judicial gatekeeping role, again not too 
surprisingly a product of the adversarial process, is his belief that 
expert evidence is more manipulable than ordinary evidence, and 
thus requires greater “judicial management.”20 
The issue of judge versus jury, when considered in three 
dimensions rather than two, is largely irrelevant.  It is the judge’s task 
to evaluate the validity of proffered expert testimony, and that is all 
there is to it.  There are an assortment of reasons why it is the judge’s 
job, some of which will appeal to Nance’s flatlanders and others to 
spacelanders.  Therefore, the question is not whether judge or jury 
should decide preliminary questions of fact (and policy) regarding 
the validity of expert evidence.  The only question is what is the 
nature of the judge’s job in this regard—the rest will be done by the 
jury. 
The relative nature of the reliability determination is perhaps 
the best reason for why the admissibility decision regarding expert 
evidence is a policy judgment.  Professor Nance and others see the 
relativity of science only as manifested in the courtroom.  Professor 
Imwinkelried, for example, in his response to Professor Nance, finds 
“three respects in which the concept [of reliability] is certainly 
relative: (1) the specificity of the claim the expert makes; (2) the use 
to which the expert’s proponent wants to put the claim; and (3) the 
definiteness with which the expert proposes couching his or her 
ultimate opinion.”21  But there is an additional dimension inherent in 
the scientific enterprise itself.  Most importantly, this is the question 
of error rates. 
Consider the two empirical questions presented in Daubert: Does 
Bendectin cause birth defects?  And, if so, did Bendectin cause the 
plaintiff’s birth defects?  The ultimate legal issue is the latter 
question, on which the plaintiff bears the burden of proof.  Here, I 
want to focus on the first question, what courts commonly refer to as 
“general causation.”  In considering proffered research on the 
 
research on the question of judge versus juror, however, remains too scant to be of 
much use.  Also, logic would suggest that judges’ repeated dealings with at least 
certain kinds of expert evidence would give them certain advantages.  The 
hypothesis, then, is not that judges are smarter or more scientifically literate than 
jurors, but that they have more experience with it.  Indeed, where judges don’t have 
more experience with science, there is reason to believe juries might have an 
advantage simply due to having multiple jurors to contemplate the complexities of 
the subject.  But these are empirical hypotheses that have yet to be studied closely.  
As the text makes clear, for me this is largely an academic question, since I believe it 
is the judge’s duty to make the admissibility decision as a matter of law. 
 20 Id. at 232. 
 21 Imwinkelried, supra note 8, at 269. 
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empirical relationship between Bendectin and birth defects, one of 
four possibilities are possible: the court could conclude that the basis 
for the asserted connection (1) is valid when it is valid (true-positive); 
(2) is valid when it is not valid (false-positive or Type 1 Error); (3) is 
not valid when it is not valid (true-negative); or (4) is not valid when 
it is valid (false-negative or Type 2 Error).  The following table 
illustrates these four possibilities: 
GROUND TRUTH 
 Valid                       Not Valid 
Valid             True-Positive           False-Positive 
COURT’S                                                                     (Type 1 Error) 
ADMISSIBILITY 
DETERMINATION 
                               Not Valid       False-Negative        True-Negative 
                                                    (Type 2 Error) 
 
Each of these possibilities ordinarily has a probability figure 
attached to it, and these rates are known with more or less 
confidence.  Here is not the place to explore the details of this point, 
for evaluating the nature of these error rates would take more space 
than this Comment permits.  Suffice it to emphasize that whatever 
decision a court makes regarding the admissibility of expert 
testimony, it faces the prospect of making one of two kinds of error.  
Given a particular amount of research, it is possible to minimize one 
kind of error while increasing the likelihood of making the other 
kind of error.  Thus, in legal terms, it is possible to increase 
conviction rates by lowering the standard inherent in the traditional 
view that it is better to let ten guilty go free than to convict one 
innocent person.  But making it easier to convict guilty people means 
that more innocent people will be convicted. 
Returning to the Bendectin example, a judge’s decision 
regarding the admissibility of expert evidence that the drug causes 
birth defects might be wrong for one of two reasons.  The court could 
conclude that Bendectin is, more likely than not, a teratogen when it 
is not (false-positive) or that Bendectin is, more likely than not, not a 
teratogen when it is (false-negative).  The consequences of these two 
kinds of error are very different.  A false positive means that the 
litigation goes forward, possibly resulting in, among other things, 
“erroneous” verdicts for plaintiffs, the removal of a beneficial drug 
from the market, and bankruptcy for the defendant.  A false negative 
means that the litigation ends, and, among other things, the 
possibilities that plaintiffs injured by the defendant’s drug do not 
  
2003 EXPERT EVIDENCE IN FLATLAND 267 
receive compensation and a dangerous drug remains available in the 
marketplace. 
Which type of error, false-positives or false-negatives, is better 
avoided is a policy judgment that is an inherent component of expert 
evidence.  Whether judges want this responsibility or not, it is theirs.  
Ignoring it does not make it go away.  Professor Nance’s flatland 
ignores this dimension of the scientific method.22  In flatland, the 
societal consequences of empirical error are not part of the 
admissibility decision because Nance’s vision lies only along the 
evidentiary plane.  It is not that this error somehow disappears or 
becomes inconsequential as a result.  It is still there, but it lies in a 
third dimension that is outside the courtroom.  The science policy 
choices that are presented by this third dimension are never 
consciously made, though they surely have consequences in the 
flatland courtroom and in flatland society beyond. 
IV.  CONCLUSION 
In the world of flatland, inhabitants cannot perceive anything 
that occurs outside the two dimensions in which they live.  From their 
vantage point, the third dimension might as well not exist.  Certainly, 
it cannot be accounted for, and can only be dimly understood.  
Professor Nance approaches the subject of expert evidence much as a 
flatlander might—in two-dimensional space.  In Nance’s flatland, 
judges would pay no heed to what occurred before the expertise 
reached the courtroom and would ignore what might happen to the 
expertise subsequently.  More troubling, Nance’s flatland-judges fail 
to consider the ramifications of their admissibility decisions both in 
regard to the development of the respective expertise and in terms of 
the costs of errors—both false positive and false negative—for society 
at-large.  In the two dimensions of Nance’s flatland, his proposals 
admittedly appear sound enough.  When his proposals are viewed in 
three dimensions, however, they lack depth and substance.  Since 
courts exist in three dimensional space, where their admissibility 
rulings have consequences for the world beyond, standards for expert 




 22 Professor Nance’s flatland perspective ignores most aspects of the scientific 
method outside of the courtroom.  In addition to the error rate problem, Professor 
Nance ignores the effect the law can have on the development of science, the guild 
issues that infect some areas of science, and the evolutionary and dynamic character 
of the scientific enterprise. 
